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Abstract 
We argue that the national state remains the main frame of reference in the field of immigration 
and ethnic relations. The cultural-historical imprint of state formation has produced distinct 
regimes for the incorporation of migrants which largely explain variations in government 
policies, public debates, and collective mobilizations concerning this policy area. We first discuss 
the debate seen in the literature between supporters of the primacy of national sovereignty and 
post-nationalist theorists. We then describe the process of construction of a EU migration policy, 
stressing the economic foundations that has driven efforts at policy coordination and the 
prevailing intergovernmental approach. Finally, we present results of an ongoing project which 
show the strong variations that exist between countries as regards policies, debates, and 
mobilizations pertaining to international migration. 
Resistance to Europeanization: 
National Barriers to Supranational Changes in Migration Policy 
 
 
Yasemin Soysal (1993: 171) stated a few years ago that “[i]mmigration, along with other social 
issue areas such as health and social welfare, remains a relatively less developed and formalized 
policy area with a limited set of policy instruments, despite its apparent bearing on the creation of 
the Community’s Internal Market.” At a time when the Schengen Agreements were still not 
applied and the Maastricht Treaty was about to come into force, EU community policy in the 
field of international migration was at its beginnings and rested largely on the willingness of 
member states to give up part of their autonomy in favor of a coordinated migration policy. That 
was occurring about 35 years after the Treaty of Rome had expressed the principle of free 
movement of people. What about six years later? Is immigration still a weak policy domain or 
has the EU acquired decision-making power in this area? Have the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Schengen Agreements, and the Treaty of Amsterdam – only to mention the most far-reaching 
efforts at international coordination – strengthened European migration policy? 
To be sure, a number of significant steps have been made at the European level with the 
aim of increasing policy coordination and harmonization in the area of international migration, 
especially during the past ten to fifteen years. Yet efforts in this direction were based mainly on 
an economic rationale and the search for policy coordination was driven mostly by an 
intergovernmental framework which largely guarantees national sovereignty, rather than by a 
truly integrated approach which allows for a shift of power from the national to the supranational 
level. Therefore the degree of institutionalization of migration policy-making instruments and 
procedures of the EU is still low. The characterization of the EU migration policy as weak and 
lacking effective policy instruments is still appropriate today. In spite of all the efforts that have 
been made, particularly in the 1990s, national states retain a large autonomy in the formulation 
and implementation of migration policies. In other words, the national state remains the principal 
frame of reference in this policy area. 
The cultural-historical imprint of state formation has led to distinct national regimes for 
the incorporation of migrants which continue to influence government policies, public debates, 
and collective mobilizations pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations. This is particularly 
true for minority integration politics, which is most directly influenced by the cultural-
institutional framework yielded by the prevailing modes of incorporation. National regimes of 
incorporation, in turn, help explain why member states have been reluctant to transfer an 
important part of their autonomy to the EU, hence leading to a weak European migration policy. 
The national state forms a powerful barrier to supranational changes in migration policy. Not 
only it is the main policy agent, but also the main political arena for the articulation of collective 
interests in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. The impact of the EU on national policy 
communities in matters pertaining to the regulation of international migration has so far remained 
quite weak, and this in spite of trends towards globalization and the increasing significance of 
transnational processes and outcomes. 
 
National Sovereignty and the Post-National Challenge 
The issue of European migration policy is embedded in a larger debate on the impact of 
globalization upon the national state and the emergence of transnational decision-making 
structures. Challenging the realist approach to international relations, which stresses the primacy 
of national interests, scholars have pointed to the crisis of the national state and the multiplication 
of decision-making centers (Rosenau 1990), to the creation of international regimes that constrain 
state policies and lead to higher levels of cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1977), and to the 
existence of unifying principles and norms that underly the international order (Ruggie 1982). 
These developments point to an increasingly greater impact of structures and processes located 
beyond the national level. In the field of international migration the debate focuses on the alleged 
loss of significance of the concept of national citizenship as a result of the emergence of a post-
national citizenship. Soysal, for example, notes that “[i]n a world within which rights, and 
identities as rights, derive their legitimacy from discourses of universalistic personhood, the 
limits of nationess, or of national citizenship, for that matter, become inventively irrelevant” 
(Soysal 1998: 210-211). In her view, in the postwar period the discourse on human rights has 
taken on a universalistic dimension and crystallizes around the idea of personhood. Such 
discourse, together with its institutionalization into social norms and practices, forms the 
normative basis for an expansion of citizenship. While the organization of the incorporation of 
immigrants in the host society remains anchored in the national state, its legitimacy is 
increasingly located at the global level, specifically in international institutions and conventions 
on human rights (Soysal 1994). This would have led to an erosion of the determination power of 
the national state, particularly so in the field of immigration. Jacobson (1996: 8-9) advances a 
similar argument, maintaining that “[t]ransnational migration is steadily eroding the traditional 
basis of nation-state membership, namely citizenship. As rights have come to be predicated on 
residency, not citizen status, the distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘alien’ has eroded” (Jacobson 
1996: 8-9). Like Soysal, Jacobson posits the emergence of a post-national citizenship based on 
the transnationalization of migrant communities and on the growing importance of supranational 
organizations and conventions. In a similar vein, Sassen (1998) speaks of a “de facto 
transnationalizing of immigration policy.” 
 Opposed to this approach, which considers the state and its relations with citizens as being 
increasingly defined by the international order, is a view that stresses the state’s autonomy and its 
prerogatives. For example, Schmitter Heisler (1992) argues that citizenship provides the best 
framework for analyzing relationships between immigrants and host societies. In the terminology 
of international relations theories, we may say, as Weiner (1985) does, that states tend to regulate 
international migration following their national interests. Rogers Brubaker’s Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany (1992) brought fresh water to the mill of those who adhere to 
this line of reasoning. According to Brubaker (1992: 3), citizenship remains a bastion of national 
sovereignty, for it is anchored in national historical traditions of membership in the state: “[…] 
definitions of citizenship continue to reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. The 
state-centered, assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France is embodied and expressed 
in a expansive definition of citizenship, one that automatically transforms second-generation 
immigrants into citizens, assimilating them – legally – to other French men and women. The 
ethnic-cultural, differentialist understanding of nationhood in Germany is embodied and 
expressed in a definition of citizenship that is remarkably open to ethnic German immigrants 
from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but remarkably closed to non-German immigrants.” 
Following the way paved by Brubaker, several comparative studies have recently shown that the 
modes of incorporation of immigrants into the host society are largely dependent on national 
configurations of citizenship (Castles 1995; Favell 1998; Koopmans and Kriesi 1997; Koopmans 
and Statham 1999a; Safran 1997; Smith and Blanc 1996). 
 These two positions are reflected in the debate on EU migration policy, a debate that 
offers us two streams corresponding to the theoretical views we have outlined. Ugur (1995) has 
called them, respectively, state-centric and society-centric. Proponents of the state-centric 
approach stress the notions of sovereignty and national interests. In this view, the lack of a 
unified European immigration policy stems largely from the reluctance of national states to give 
up their sovereignty. Single countries are expected to regulate migration issues according to 
domestic interests and priorities. As a result, migration policies should display significant 
differences from one country to the other. Coordination at the European level is reached mainly 
through intergovernmental agreements. Supporters of the society-centric approach, in contrast, 
point to the increasing interdependence of national situations, globalization, and the impact of 
transnational institutions. Jacobson (1996), for example, stresses the role of the European 
Convention of Human Rights as an international legal basis to which individuals and non-
governmental organizations can refer to claim their rights. In his view, these “rights across 
borders” bring a fundamental challenge to the traditional basis of national membership, that is, 
citizenship. More generally, authors working within this framework focus on nonstate factors that 
undermine the role played by national sovereignty (Hammar 1990; Plender 1988; Straubhaar and 
Zimmerman 1993). From the point of view of the regulation of immigration, this view 
underscores policy harmonization through the creation of power centers and institutions located 
above the national state. Thus Soysal (1993) argues that, despite the lack of formal EU 
authoritative rules and structures, one observes much standardization at the European and 
national levels, both as regards policymaking processes and policy outcomes. This, together with 
the expansion of the EU agenda to include various new issue areas which contributes to the 
creation of a common discourse and understanding, would point to a Europeanization of 
immigration policy beyond the simple aggregation of national agendas. 
Although we acknowledge the increasing relevance of global processes and outcomes as 
well as recent trends towards a Europeanization of migration policies, we think that it is much too 
early to speak of a loss of significance of the national state in this policy area. As several authors 
have argued (Dummet and Nicol 1990; Heisler 1992; Hollifield 1992a, 1992b; Joppke 1998), in a 
way combining the state-centric and the society-centric approaches, dynamics inherent to 
national politics affect the saliency and extent of international and transnational developments. In 
the remainder of this paper we will try to show that the national state remains the main frame of 
reference for the elaboration and implementation of migration policies, first by looking at the 
difficulties encountered in the creation of a truly integrated European migration policy and 
second by arguing that the national regimes for the incorporation of migrants largely explain the 
prevalence of country-specific responses in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. 
 
The Long and Difficult March towards a European Migration Policy 
Reduced to the essential, EU migration policy can bee described as a series of steps aimed at 
easing internal freedom of movement and strengthening control of external borders. The driving 
force behind the easing of internal freedom of movement was basically economic, as the creation 
of a common economic market was an objective that could not be reached without introducing 
geographical mobility of the labor force, in addition to free movement of goods, capitals, and 
services. In the Treaty of Rome of 1957 free movement was granted to people who would move 
for economic purposes, not to people as citizens (Callovi 1992). As stated in Article 48 of the 
treaty, the purpose was to eliminate discrimination based on nationality, but only with respect to 
employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work. This focus on the market, the weak 
emphasis given to rights of immigrant workers (other than those regarding the access to the labor 
market) and their family members, and the virtual absence of discussion on migration flows from 
third countries at the Community level, clearly indicate to the lack of a European migration 
policy at this stage. 
This state of affairs did not change after 1968, when Regulation 1612/68 completed the 
gradual transition to internal freedom of movement for nationals of the member countries. The 
nationality principle as a basis for the free movement of labor within the Community was now 
definitively accepted; only those workers that were nationals of one of the member states had the 
right to move freely within the Community. The acceptance of this principle finalized the process 
of creating insiders and outsiders in the area on international migration (Ugur 1995), and shows 
the willingness on the part of European institutions to regulate this policy area following a double 
logic: internal freedom versus external control. At this stage, in spite of having shifted from being 
merely a service organization to sharing implementation responsibilities, the role of the 
Commission was still limited. In addition, the regulation of immigration flows in the area of third 
country nationals was made on the basis of an intergovernmental framework. In fact, this area 
was regarded as the exclusive preserve of national sovereignty at least up to the mid 1970s 
(Callovi 1992). Attempts by the Commission to establish an integrated framework of policy 
coordination in the field of migration during the 1970s found much resistance from member 
states, which were more inclined to follow an intergovernmental approach, especially with regard 
to immigration from third countries. 
 A number of important initiatives for the harmonization of migration policy took place in 
1985, a year that marks the speeding up of the process of European integration. To begin with, 
the Commission submitted to the Council a communication on guidelines for a Community 
policy on migration in which it proposed to increase consultation and cooperation in the area of 
third-country migration. In addition, it adopted a related Decision aimed precisely at promoting 
prior communication and consultation on migration policies regarding non-member countries. 
Yet in the early 1980s “the concerns of the member states were about maintaining national 
control on immigration policy and not about whether or not policy harmonization is necessary or 
desirable” (Ugur 1995: 985). This is clearly seen in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the 
first major amendment to the Treaty of Rome, which institutionalized the creation of the internal 
market. The main point of the SEA was the removal of physical controls, an objective that was 
pursued in respect of the principle of national sovereignty. As a general declaration part of the 
treaty states: “[n]othing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States to take such 
measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration from third 
countries” (quoted in Callovi 1992: 258). To be sure, a Political Declaration attached to the SEA 
committed the member states to cooperate among other in the area of immigration control, but 
this cooperation would follow an intergovernmental framework, hence excluding Community 
institutions (Dearden 1997). 
 The stress on the intergovernmental approach can also be seen in the Schengen 
Agreement signed in 1985 by France, Germany, and the Benelux countries. This charter outside 
the EU attests quite clearly to the ambivalence inherent in the harmonization of migration policy 
at the European level. The basic aim of the Agreement is quite representative of the whole 
process of policy coordination in the field of migration at the European level: the elimination of 
internal border controls and the intensification of control on external borders. Of course, open 
frontiers imply rules regarding external control and specific provisions for regulating the 
establishment and circulation of foreign nationals (in particular, a common visa policy and the 
treatment of requests for asylum). Thus this accord, together with its more elaborated 
Implementing Convention (Schengen II) signed in 1990, secures freedom of movement within 
the territory of the signatory countries, while representing at the same time another move towards 
the creation of “fortress Europe.” 
 Indeed, intergovernmentalism increased during this period. A number of further 
intergovernmental initiatives were taken after the 1985 Schengen Agreement, attesting once more 
to the difficulties of creating a European migration policy based on an integrated framework. 
Among those initiatives are the expansion of the activities of the TREVI group to immigration 
issues in 1986, the Convention on External Borders, the Ad Hoc Immigration Group within the 
Council’s secretariat, the 1990 Dublin Convention on asylum seekers, and the 1992 London 
Resolution. However, the common control of external borders or certain rules regulating the 
responsibilities for accepting asylum seekers did not mean the creation of an active and 
coordinated policy on migration. Thus, as Callovi (1992: 359) has noted, “no doctrine has been 
developed on a gradual common policy on immigration nor on the way domestic immigration 
policies could fit into a coherent Community strategy. Each country has been trying to solve its 
own problems.” In addition, member states have sometimes explicitly opposed common charters 
aimed at policy coordination, for they stroked against national interests. At least up to the 
Maastricht Treaty, among the main features of policy coordination in the field on international 
migration were “the insistence on avoiding Community’s powers and responsibilities and the will 
to embody any common decision in a series of intergovernmental agreements rather than in 
Community legally-binding instruments” (Callovi 1992: 362). 
 Things changed only slightly after signature of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), or 
Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. The TEU extends Community rights from the mere economic 
dimension to the social, cultural, and political realms. Article K1 defines the following areas as 
matters of common interest: asylum policy, border control and regulation, as well as immigration 
and immigrant policy. In brief, virtually all aspects of migration policy are defined in the TEU 
migration policy as common interest. In these areas the European Commission and member states 
share the power of initiative. Most of these common interest matters, however, continued to be 
dealt with following an intergovernmental framework: “[i]n accordance with the Maastricht 
Treaty’s concept of subsidiarity, the field of immigration from nonmember states, together with 
the associated fields of justice and home affairs, remains what is known as an intergovernmental 
pillar of the Treaty, that is to say, the business of individual sovereign member governments 
working together, although the European Commission is to be associated with decisionmaking 
and has some limited powers of initiative” (Convey and Kupiszewski 1995: 941). 
With the TEU freedom of movement is definitively detached from the status of economic 
agent that was prevailing in the early years of the European project. Yet the main point here is 
that, due to opposition from some member states (in particular, the United Kingdom) to the 
erosion of national sovereignty, the TEU explicitly adopted a double-track approach to policy 
coordination in the area of migration: an integrated framework based on Community law and 
institutions, and an intergovernmental framework resting on direct consultation and agreements 
among member states. But the latter approach was still prevailing. 
 The most recent and powerful move towards an integrated European migration policy 
came with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. Three contributions of this treaty are noteworthy for 
our present purpose. First and foremost, a new Title was added to the EC Treaty regarding the 
free movement of people and immigration policy, including visas, asylum policy, and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters. As a result, many of these issues are transferred from the third to the 
first pillar of the EU and therefore fall under EU responsibility. In practice, the matters of 
common interest as defined by the TEU become part of Community law and treated 
supranationally. Second, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporates the arrangements agreed upon at 
Schengen (now involving 13 countries), as well as subsequent acts such as the Implementing 
Convention. Some of these arrangements are allocated by means of Protocol to the first pillar of 
the EU, some others to the third pillar. In the former case, this implies a shift from an 
intergovernmental to an integrated framework of policy coordination. Third, the role of the 
European parliament and of the President of the European Commission is strengthened. The 
parliament, in particular, witnesses a considerable extension of the scope of the “co-decision 
procedure.” In addition, there are some extensions of the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice and other institutions. 
 With the Treaty of Amsterdam, intra-EU freedom of movement applies to everybody 
regardless of nationality. In other words, once a person has entered the EU, she can move freely. 
Hence the need to reinforce control at the external borders and a resulting likely homogenization 
in this area. However, we must not forget that competence and responsibility as regards 
immigration policy is far from being fully transferred to the European level. In spite of a real 
advance in this respect, member states will keep large part of their sovereignty. For, in 
accordance with Article 63 of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, they can at any time keep or introduce national provisions insofar as the latter are 
compatible with international treaties and accords. In addition, the treaty reinforces the idea that 
European citizenship is subject to national citizenship rather than replacing it. Therefore, in spite 
of the real advances made with the Treaty of Amsterdam, it is difficult to assess the extent of the 
strengthened role of European institutions in this area. 
 
The Persistence of the National State as the Main Frame of Reference for Regulating, 
Debating, and Mobilizing in the Field of International Migration 
The difficulties encountered in creating a common migration policy within the EU both reflects 
and explains the persistence of the national state as the main frame of reference for regulating, 
debating, and mobilizing in the field of international migration. In spite of the willingness to 
reach better policy coordination and harmonization – especially with the aim of easing intra-EU 
freedom of movement, seen as a necessary condition for creating the single market –, member 
states have shown some reluctance to give up their sovereignty in this area. Such reluctance 
stems above all from the need to retain control over national borders and territory, hence over 
security matters, and leads to important cross-national differences in immigration policies. For 
example, much variation exists as regards the “gates” regulating the inflow and settlement of 
foreigners (Convey and Kupiszewski 1995): entry visa requirements, border external controls, 
long-term and residence permits, internal controls, permanent residence permits and 
regularization systems, and naturalization. 
The most visible differences among states, however, can be observed in the ways they 
deal with ethnic minorities living in the host society. In this respect, recent comparative work has 
stressed the importance of citizenship rights for determining the ways in which migrants are 
incorporated into the receiving country (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Favell 1998; Smith and 
Blanc 1996; Schnapper 1991; Soysal 1994). In particular, it is useful to distinguish between 
different national regimes for the incorporation of migrants according to the formal criteria for 
obtaining citizenship and to the cultural obligations posed on prospective citizens (Koopmans and 
Statham 1999a). On the one hand, citizenship is accorded on the basis of ethnic-cultural or civic-
territorial criteria, a distinction that grossly reflects that between jus sanguinis and jus solis, that 
is, between citizenship rights based on birth and kinship or, alternatively, on choice and 
belonging to a political community (Brubaker 1992). On the other hand, the acquisition of 
citizenship is contingent upon assimilation to the dominant (national) culture or, following a 
cultural-pluralistic view, allows for the recognition of particular cultures and identities of 
migrants. Of course, these are analytical distinctions. The empirical cases always present some 
combinations of these criteria. Nevertheless, these analytical distinctions allow us to explain 
variations from one national context to the other. 
Combining these two dimensions, we stress three basic models of incorporation of 
migrants in the host society. The ethnic-assimilationist model, as the name indicates, combines an 
ethnic-cultural definition of citizenship with an assimilationist view of the cultural obligations for 
obtaining it. In this case, migrants (which tend to be seen as foreigners) encounter a closed 
national community and, at the same time, are asked to adapt to the norms and cultural codes of 
the host society, thus downplaying their ethnic difference. Switzerland and Germany are 
examples of this model. The civic-pluralist model is characterized by a civic-territorial 
conception of citizenship which tends to include migrants within the national community and 
poses little demands as to the cultural obligations for becoming members of that community. In 
other words, ethnic minorities have easy access to citizenship and are at the same time recognized 
their right to difference. Britain and the Netherlands are often mentioned examples of this regime 
of incorporation of migrants. The civic-assimilationist model is a sort of intermediate case, for it 
combines a civic-territorial conception of citizenship with an assimilationist view of the cultural 
obligations posed on migrants. Most typically, this is the case of France. While it is relatively 
easy to become French, ethnic-based identities must be given up and the republican ideal of the 
state must be accepted. 
 The strong imprint of the national regimes for the incorporation of migrants explains to a 
large extent the difficulty encountered by the EU in developing a common framework on 
immigration and ethnic relations. At the same time, national traditions and regimes for the 
incorporation of migrants allow us to understand the existence of important cross-national 
variations in state policies, public debates, and collective mobilizations pertaining to the 
regulation of immigration flows and the management of ethnic difference. In the following we 
draw from an ongoing research on the mobilization on ethnic relations, citizenship, and 
immigration (MERCI) to show the extent to which different national regimes for the 
incorporation of migrants affect claim-making in this field. Public claim-making includes all 
political decisions, speech acts, and collective mobilizations that appeared in the public space. 
Specifically, we collected acts involving demands, criticisms, or proposals about immigration, 
ethnic minority integration, xenophobia, and antiracism. The data were collected on a national 
newspaper in each country and cover the period from 1990 to 1994. 
 In order to assess the impact of national regimes for the incorporation of migrants, we 
compare two countries that have quite distinct national traditions: France and Switzerland. 
Switzerland, as we said, follows an ethnic-assimilationist model. The ethnic definition of 
citizenship implies the exclusion of migrants from the national community. Much like Germany 
and in spite of hosting nearly 20 % of migrants, Switzerland has never defined itself as a country 
of immigration. Newcomers are officially labeled as “foreigners” and traditionally considered as 
guestworkers living in the country only on a temporary basis or as asylum seekers and political 
refugees. As a consequence, little is done to improve the conditions and integration of migrants in 
the host society, both at the policy level and in public discourse. In contrast, France’s civic-
assimilationist model tends to consider newcomers as members of the national community. 
However, this inclusiveness has an assimilative bias. Unlike for example in Britain and in the 
Netherlands, the republican principles of universality and equality between all the members of 
the French community prevent migrants from receiving special treatment as collectivities. Thus 
French authorities do enact policies aimed at the integration of migrants, but these policies avoid 
to promote cultural and ethnic difference. They tend instead to facilitate the access of migrants to 
French institutions and to promote equal treatment of all the members of the national community. 
 National regimes for the incorporation of migrants impinge on the structure of public 
debates, political decisions, and collective mobilizations pertaining to immigration and ethnic 
relations. To begin with, we expect France and Switzerland to display substantial variations in the 
content of public debates in this field. The ethnic-assimilationist model of incorporation should 
frame public debates in terms of regulation of flows rather than minority integration. As in 
Switzerland migrants are not fully part of the national community and tend to be considered as 
workers residing in the country only on a temporary basis, we expect public debates not to focus 
on the ways they could or should be integrated into the host society. In contrast, as migrants in 
France are considered and consider themselves as belonging to the national community, we 
expect public debates there to deal extensively on their integration into the French society rather 
than on the regulation of immigration flows. 
 Table 1 gives us a first indication of the varying ways in which the politics of immigration 
and ethnic relations is framed in different national contexts. It shows the distribution of public 
claims pertaining to the thematic field under study in France and Switzerland for the period from 
1990 to 1994. The differences are quite striking and largely support our predictions. While public 
debates in Switzerland focus mainly on immigration, asylum, and aliens politics, that is, on the 
regulation of flows, in France minority integration politics and issues related to racism, 
xenophobia, and antiracism play a greater role. In Switzerland, 60.6% of the claims appearing in 
the public space regard the inflows (but also the outflows) of migrants, especially in relation to 
the situation of asylum seekers. More detailed analyses show indeed that the management of 
asylum seekers (entry and border controls, expulsions and deportations) captures most of the 
attention of Swiss political actors. Political asylum in Switzerland has deep historical roots which 
go back to the flow of protestant refugees from Italy, the Low Countries, southern Germany, and 
above all France during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries (Caloz-Tschopp 1989; Vuilleumier 
1987). Furthermore, “Switzerland – country of asylum” is a myth that has nourished the 
formation of Swiss national identity, and still partly does so (Parini 1997). It is therefore not 
surprising that a large share of the public debates in this country deal with an issue that in the 
1990s became very salient. The conflict between supporters and opponents of a more restrictive 
policy towards asylum seekers in Switzerland has dominated the public debates in recent years, 
while the question of the integration of residents of migrant origin into the Swiss society has a 
lower mobilization capacity. Within the category of minority integration politics and that of 
racism, xenophobia, and antiracism, the issues that mobilize most frequently are those of 
naturalization and the general evaluation of governmental policies regarding minorities and 
racism. However, as we saw, these issues are relatively marginal as compared to the regulation of 
immigration flows, particularly that of asylum seekers. 
 
Table 1 
 
 Public debates have a different structure in France. Minority integration politics and issues 
related to racism, xenophobia, and antiracism cover 69.4% of the claims in the field of 
immigration and ethnic relations. They are by and large the main focus in the French context. 
More detailed analyses indicate that minority rights and their participation in the host society are 
salient issues with a high mobilization capacity. In particular, the issue of the respect (or, 
conversely, denial) of specific religious rights has played quite an important role. The Islamic 
veil affair has provoked an intense debate in France in the first half of the 1990s. Muslim 
migrants asked the respect of their cultural practices, especially with regard to the freedom for 
young women to wear the Islamic veil in public places such as schools. The authorities and other 
political actors replied that the politics of difference is not acceptable in the French Republic. The 
principles of universality, equality, and laïcité could not stand the promotion of ethnic difference 
by the state. 
Within the category of racism, xenophobia, and antiracism, most claims regard the general 
evaluation of governmental policy and the condemnation of the extreme right. The large share of 
antiracist claims can be explained in part with the strong presence of an extreme right party – the 
Front National – in French politics, which is the explicit or implicit target of most antiracist 
claims. Also criticized are the alliances that other political actors establish with this party and 
which provide it with opportunities to seize the power at the local level. More generally, demands 
are made for social and educational responses against racism.  
The regulation of immigration flows is clearly less salient in France than in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, it is related to asylum politics to a much lesser extent. French public debates less 
often deal with entry and border control issues. There is also the question of the status of 
residence, which can be seen in the claims dealing with the attribution of working and residence 
permits. The civic-assimilationist model encourages such claims. In a country where newcomers 
belong to the national community, permits become an important stake. The issues of sans-papiers 
and illegal immigrants is quite salient in French politics. The French civic-assimilationist model 
hardly accepts the presence of individuals who live on its territory without being fully part of the 
national community. 
Thus far we have shown the differences existing between France and Switzerland in the 
public debates pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations. What about political decisions? 
Minority integration policies adopted by European countries share a number of characteristics, in 
particular with regard to the rights and status of migrants (Soysal 1993). In addition, several more 
specific common trends can be observed (Mahnig and Wimmer 1998): first, there is a general 
trend towards equality of rights; second, most policies and measures against social 
marginalization no longer target migrants only, but all groups subject to exclusion; third, 
integration policies are increasingly based upon mediation and dialogue with minority groups and 
their spokespersons, specifically through the sponsoring of migrant organizations and the creation 
of institutions that mediate between them and the state. Nevertheless, minority integration 
policies display strong cross-national variations as each nation tends to privilege certain policy 
areas depending on the cultural-institutional setting that frames the shared understanding of the 
criteria of membership of migrants in the national community.  
 Back to our comparison of France and Switzerland, it is reasonable to maintain that Swiss 
authorities so far have not enacted specific policies aimed at the integration of migrants. The 
latter are perceived in Switzerland as guestworkers and are welcome to the extent that they can 
contribute to the progress of the Swiss economy. The status of seasonal worker was developed to 
better adapt immigration flows to the needs of the economy. The Swiss model of incorporation of 
migrants is based on the principle that the integration of migrants in the host society depends on 
their integration in the labor market. Very little has been made at the national level to improve the 
situation of newcomers. For example, a federal commission was created in 1970 with the aim of 
improving the relations with ethnic minorities. However, this commission has little competence 
and financial resources (Soysal 1994). The same applies at the local level. Most cantons have 
created special agencies to improve the integration of migrants, but these offices are relatively 
ineffective, although much more has been done as compared to the national level. 
 Minority integration politics in France faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it has to grant 
full access to the society, that is, equal opportunity for migrants. On the other hand, however, this 
objective must be reached without offering specific programs to ethnic minorities as the 
recognition of ethnic difference is not accepted. The republican ideal of universality and equal 
treatment among all the members of the national community does not provide for specific 
programs targeting particular social groups. The republican dilemma has promoted public aid for 
migrants to grant them a better access to French institutions (schools, administration, social 
security, labor market, housing, etc.), but without dealing with the politics of difference. For 
example, the French administration has enacted policies in favor of the population of the 
banlieues (suburbs) in order to improve the quality of life and to prevent social exclusion. Special 
programs for young people (sport, cultural and social programs, etc.) have in particular been 
promoted. In most suburbs migrants are the main recipients of these programs. Yet the latter were 
set up for the entire population living in disadvantaged neighborhoods, not specifically for 
migrants. The republican philosophy clashes against the politics of  difference such as it exists for 
example in Britain and the Netherlands. 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of political decisions regarding immigration and ethnic 
relations in France and Switzerland for the 1990-1994 period. As can be seen, they largely reflect 
public claim-making in general: a much greater emphasis on minority integration policy as well 
as on racism, xenophobia, and antiracism in France and on the regulation of immigration flows in 
Switzerland. As we said, the Swiss authorities seldom legislate to improve the integration of 
migrants. Most of the time they act as gatekeepers, in particular vis-à-vis asylum seekers. 
Political decisions pertain primarily to entry and border control, expulsions, the reorganization of 
institutions in charge of asylum policy (usually with the aim of speeding up the decisional 
process), and legal permits for migrants. Decisions concerning minority integration, on the other 
hand, are rare. Only a third of all the political decisions taken in the field of immigration and 
ethnic relations during the period under study deal with this aspect. 
In France, the structure of political decisions pertaining to immigration and ethnic 
relations differ very much from those taken in Switzerland. French legislation focuses on 
minority integration and on issues related to racism, xenophobia, and antiracism. Much like 
public debates, political decisions deal primarily with migrants’ rights and their participation in 
the host society. In addition, the French authorities lead an active policy of repression and judicial 
response against racist behaviors. While the share of events dealing with the regulation of 
immigration flows is larger for political decisions than for public debates, this aspect is much less 
salient for the French authorities than for the Swiss authorities. Like in Switzerland, decisions 
concerning the regulation of flows deal mainly with entry and border control, residence and labor 
permits, and the expulsion of illegal immigrants. In France, however, they are much more 
frequent.  
 
Table 2 
 
After having examined public debates and political decisions, we now turn to collective 
mobilizations. We focus on the mobilization of ethnic minorities in the host society. Again, we 
expect national traditions to influence the possibility for migrants to address their claims in the 
public space. The symbolic definition of citizenship and more generally the shared understanding 
of the modalities of inclusion in or exclusion from the national community influence the degree 
to which migrants feel as belonging to that community. In the Swiss ethnic-assimilationist 
context minorities have little room for intervening in (national) public debates on issues 
pertaining to immigration and ethnic relations. They tend not to be seen as members of the 
national community and therefore are given little legitimacy to act as collective actors in the 
national public space. The French civic-assimilationist model, in contrast, offers a more favorable 
environment for minority groups to address issues related to their integration into the host 
society. But again, this model poses a dilemma. The inclusion of migrants in the national 
community grants ethnic minorities access to the public space. However, the republican 
principles of universality and equality between all the members of the French community do not 
legitimize them to mobilize along ethnic lines. Thus ethnic minorities in France have ambivalent 
opportunities. On the one hand, they are granted access to the national public space. On the other 
hand, however, they have little legitimacy to mobilize on the basis of their cultural diversity. 
Migrants should therefore have a stronger presence in public debates in France than in 
Switzerland, but a weaker presence than in a country following a civic-pluralist model of 
incorporation, such as Britain or the Netherlands. The civic-pluralist model not only grants 
migrants easy access to the public space, but denies the recognition of ethnic difference and 
hence makes it legitimate for them to mobilize along ethnic lines. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of public claims by ethnic minorities in France and 
Switzerland for the period under study. If we consider all claims regardless of the policy field 
addressed, the difference is not very strong as minorities have a slightly larger presence in the 
public space in Switzerland (13.1 %) than in France (12.4%). If we get a closer look, however, 
we realize that more than a half of their claims are addressed to their homeland, asking for more 
democracy, the respect of human rights, and other homeland issues. Only rarely do migrants 
address issues related to their integration in the Swiss society. In contrast, when they enter the 
public space in France their claims often deal with French politics, although they presence is 
weaker than in Britain (Koopmans and Statham 1999a). In this sense, France is an intermediate 
case between “closed” Switzerland and more “open” Britain, whose civic-pluralist model 
provides ethnic minorities with larger opportunities for participation.  
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 National traditions go a long way in explaining cross-national variations in political 
decisions, public debates, and collective mobilizations in the field of immigration and ethnic 
relations. These variations from one national context to the other show how important the 
national state remains for both policy-making and claim-making. We have a further indicator of 
that if we look at the scope of claim-making. Table 4 shows for the period studied the distribution 
of public claims according to their territorial and/or political scope. By and large, the main scope 
in both countries is the national state and its sublevels (regional, local). This holds true especially 
in France, while in Switzerland migrant homeland claims are more frequent. Regarding homeland 
politics, as we said, this is a result of the poor opportunities for ethnic minorities to address issues 
related to their situation in the receiving country. The strong emphasis on the national level 
contrasts with the minor relevance of Europe as the scope of claim-making. Thus the 
Europeanization of migration policy seem not to have deeply affected the national debates in this 
area. This finding is confirmed when we look at the addressee of claims (for those events for 
which we have coded an actor as addressee, positive reference, or negative reference) as 
European-level actors are virtually never targeted. 
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Conclusion 
To deny that policy coordination and harmonization efforts aimed at creating a European 
migration policy have led nowhere would mean to largely overlook the advances made in this 
field. The situation today has no doubt improved as compared to ten or fifteen years ago. EU 
institutions are increasingly involved in policy-making to regulate immigration flows as well as 
to improve the rights and conditions of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, member states tend to 
take into account what the other states do when they look for policy solutions to a much larger 
extent than in the past. In brief, we have certainly witnessed policy convergence in this area. 
However, the search for common solutions has been made mostly within an intergovernmental 
framework, at least up to the Treaty of Amsterdam, which has for the first time transferred 
substantial competencies to the EU. A truly integrated European migration policy is far from 
being established. 
 The lack of an integrated, coherent, and effective migration policy results in part from the 
strategic refusal on the part of certain member states to give up their sovereignty with regard to 
the regulation of migration flows for fear of losing control over national security matters. Of 
course, it also stems from the difficulties inherent in mounting a project that involves several 
countries with different needs and aims. The absence of a genuine EU migration policy, in turn, 
reverberates upon the possibility for the emergence of a political arena for the articulation of 
collective interests in this area at the European level. As was recently stressed with reference to 
ethnic mobilization, “[t]he opportunities for this kind of mobilization are extremely limited by the 
early stage of institutionalization of supranational powers over immigration, and those 
opportunities which do exist for transnational mobilization are monopolized by a small range of 
elite actors who dominate the emerging ‘political field’ of immigration at the European level” 
(Favell and Geddes 1999: 3-4). The weakness of EU institutions and procedures for regulating 
migration makes the task of creating a European political arena for addressing issues in this area 
particularly difficult. For, without a well-defined power center, there is little room and few 
opportunities for the articulation of collective interests. In addition, we must not forget the 
difficulty to create a European public space which can convey in an adequate fashion the public 
debates on migration issues. The creation of such public space is a very difficult task, perhaps an 
impossible one, if only due to the plurality of languages among member states (Kriesi 1999). 
Nevertheless, should it emerge in the future, the national state and the national public space 
would be likely to lose much of their present relevance. 
 Given this state of affairs, it should not be surprising that domestic actors and institutions 
remain the principal agents for dealing with migration issues. National policy communities have 
certainly adapted to the changes occurring at the supranational level, not only European. Yet 
national barriers to supranational changes in migration policy have formed a front of resistance to 
Europeanization. As a result, differences, at least for the time being, seem to overwhelm 
similarities and convergences. The national state remains the main frame of reference for 
regulating, debating, and mobilizing over immigration and ethnic relations. This is not only due 
to the lack of a European political arena and a European public space. It stems above all from the 
historical legacy of the construction of the national state itself, whose principles of definition of 
the rights and duties as well as of the inclusion and exclusion of those who are entitled to such 
rights and duties – i.e. citizenship – still fundamentally influence the interests and behaviors of 
social and political actors. 
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Table 1: Public claims in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship, and immigration in France  
  and Switzerland, 1990-1994 
 
 
 France Switzerland 
Immigration, asylum, and aliens 
politics 
27.6 60.6 
Minority integration politics 29.3 16.7 
Racism/xenophobia and 
antiracism 43.1 22.8 
Total 
N 
100% 
1773 
100% 
966 
 
NOTE: Includes both verbal and non-verbal claims. 
Table 2: Political decisions in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship, and immigration in  
  France and Switzerland, 1990-1994 
 
 
 France Switzerland 
Immigration, asylum, and aliens 
politics 
48.8 72.7 
Minority integration politics 35.5 21.3 
Racism/xenophobia and 
antiracism 15.7 6.0.5 
Total 
N 
100% 
242 
100% 
216 
Table 3: Distribution of public claims by ethnic minorities in France and Switzerland,  
  1990-1994 
 
 All claims ERCI field   
 France Switzerland France Switzerland 
Minority actors 
involved 12.4. 12.6 13.1 4.6 
Other actors 
involved 87.6 87.4 86.9 95.4 
Total 
N 
100% 
2449 
100% 
1193 
100% 
1773 
100% 
966 
 
NOTE: Includes both verbal and non-verbal claims. 
Table 4: Territorial and/or political scope of public claims in France and Switzerland, 
              1990-1994  
 
 France 
 
Switzerland 
 
   
Supra- or transnational: European 4.9 2.9 
Supra- or transnational: other 2.5 3.1 
Foreign national: migrant 
homeland 0.7 11.9 
Foreign national: other 0.2 0.7 
Bilateral 0.1 - 
National or sub-national 91.6 85.0 
   
Total 
N 
100% 
2064 
100% 
1043 
 
NOTE: Excludes non-verbal claims. Includes claims by ethnic minorities and the extreme right not related to 
immigration, ethnic minority integration, xenophobia, or antiracism. 
 
Notes 	  
